"The insurgency grew. By December, Castro was scared. He wasn't going to win by fighting—he never had.

"Then, somehow, inexplainably, the word came to let the Escambray dry up . . support of these insurgents may be wrong . . there may be criminal elements there . . . they might set up a Socialist government . . you wouldn't want another Batista, would you? . . .



"In the U. S.-controlled camps of the liberation air force, support for the Escambray faltered and such missions as were allowed were planned to fail.

"The airplanes were there, the supplies were there, the dedicated Cuban crews were there — more than willing to give their lives to strike a blow for freedom, as they proved later last April.

"The missions were 'pinched off,' all for 'good and sufficient reasons' . . . you wouldn't want another Batista, would you?

"The morale of the Cuban patriots in the camps was broken. They deserted and defected. The starving remnants of the hopes of Cuba straggled and fought their way out of the Escambray in February and March.

"Then came the fiasco at the

Bahia de Cochinos in April, which is known to all.

"The returning Cuban fliers, after the invasion attempt, found none of their former United States 'contacts' in Miami.



"They turned to my office (which then was in the Naval Reserve Armory) for information on their casualties, on their future, and to register their disgust with those who lied to them about promised U.S. air support and about 'softening', missions which never materialized.

"I had no guidance on their future and could get none

"I did advise the Air Force intelligence office that with some encouragement the personnel element of the Cuban liberation air force could be held together and constituted the most important asset left to us.

"I received back a 'keep on top of it.'

"At this particular point, my office probably had more detailed information on what had happened to the Cuban forces than any other. From the returning patriots we learned of all the mistakes.



"It was shortly afterward that the local CIA agent called and said he had received word from Washington for our office to stop talking to Cubans or our careers would be forfeited.

"The incredible thing in this whole crazy business is that

Communists are so easily beaten if we but fight them.

"But it seems that anyone now who is outspokenly anti-Communist is going to get it in the neck.

"In this present day, the advanced degree to which the effects of brainwashing have penetrated into the policy-making organs of our beloved United States is as distressing as it is incredible."

Col. Stevers has sent memorandums of his views to several senators including George Smathers and Barry Goldwater of Arizona.